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OPINION 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Appellee Lincoln T. Griswold purchased a life 
insurance policy that was later sold to Appellant Coventry 
First LLC (Coventry) for an allegedly inflated price that 
included undisclosed kickbacks to the broker. Griswold sued, 
and Coventry moved to dismiss the case for lack of standing 
or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration. The District Court 
denied the motion and Coventry appealed. Two questions are 
presented: (1) whether we have appellate jurisdiction to 
review the District Court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for 
lack of standing; and (2) whether the District Court erred 
when it denied a motion to compel arbitration.  
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I 
This appeal arises from an alleged fraud in connection 
with a “life settlement,” which involves the sale of a life 
insurance policy for more than its cash-surrender value but 
less than the net death benefit. The purchaser of the policy 
pays the premiums until the original policy owner’s death, at 
which time the purchaser collects the death benefit.  
In January 2006, Griswold purchased an $8.4 million 
life insurance policy. He then established the Lincoln T. 
Griswold Irrevocable Trust (the Trust) under Georgia law for 
the “sole and exclusive purpose” of owning the policy and he 
disclaimed any personal “right, title or interest in or power, 
privilege or incident of ownership” in the trust property. He 
appointed Wells Fargo Bank to serve as Trustee.  
  Two weeks after the Trust was formed, Griswold 
named Griswold LLP1 as its sole beneficiary.2 According to 
the terms of the partnership agreement, Griswold LLP would 
                                                 
1 The partners in the LLP were Griswold, who owned 
99% of the shares, and his son, Kirk Griswold, who owned 
the remainder.  
  
2 The partnership also served as the borrower under a 
financing agreement made with Bedrock Financing, in which 
the partnership received funds and then transmitted them to 
the Trust to pay the premiums on the life insurance policy. 
The partnership agreement specifically prohibited the 
partnership from “engag[ing] in any business or activity 
whatsoever except as specifically authorized” in the 
partnership agreement or the financing agreement with 
Bedrock. JA 370 (§ 2.7).  
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dissolve once it fulfilled its limited purpose of receiving the 
proceeds of the life insurance policy. At that point, it would 
enter into a “winding-up period,” during which the trustee 
was tasked with “liquidating its property, satisfying the 
claims of its creditors, and distributing any remaining 
property or the proceeds therefrom to the Partners.” JA 382 (§ 
9.3). Upon completion of the winding up period, the 
liquidating trustee would file a “Cancellation of the Election 
to Become a Limited Liability Partnership” to terminate the 
partnership. JA 384 (§ 9.8).  
 In January 2006, the Trust appointed Mid-Atlantic 
Financial as its exclusive agent to “identify, select and 
appoint” a life-settlement broker who would help the Trust 
sell Griswold’s life insurance policy. JA 326 (§ 1.1). Mid-
Atlantic selected Kevin McGarrey, who had previously 
assisted Griswold in procuring the policy, to be the settlement 
broker. In March 2008, McGarrey reached out to Appellant 
Coventry First LLC (Coventry), a Pennsylvania-based insurer 
and significant player in the life settlement industry, 
indicating that Griswold’s life insurance policy was for sale 
and that Mid-Atlantic had authorized him to broker a life 
settlement for a commission of $84,000. In his complaint, 
Griswold alleges that Coventry rigged the bidding process by 
having McGarrey sign a written producer agreement—the 
“Secret McGarrey Agreement”—promising to refrain from 
seeking any further bids and to report any competing offers 
and their material terms to Coventry. In exchange, Coventry 
allegedly allowed McGarrey to “self-determine” his 
commission to the tune of $145,000, which was $61,000 
more than what he was entitled to. Accordingly, McGarrey 
did not put the policy on the competitive market and did not 
pursue any other potential buyers.  
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Coventry offered $1.675 million for the Griswold 
policy—$1.53 million for the policy and $145,000 for 
McGarrey’s commission. Coventry and McGarrey did not 
disclose the amount of broker compensation to the Trust or to 
Griswold.3 On March 31, 2008, the Trust sold its policy to 
Coventry without having received a competing offer. The 
written purchase agreement contained the following 
arbitration clause:  
All disputes and controversies of every kind and nature 
between the Parties arising out of or in connection with 
this Agreement including, but not limited to, its 
existence, construction, validity, interpretation or 
meaning, performance, non-performance, enforcement, 
operation, breach, continuance, or termination thereof 
shall be submitted and settled by arbitration in 
accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association.  
JA 648 (§ 8.8). Once Coventry acquired the life insurance 
policy, the Trust dissolved, having fulfilled its sole purpose. 
The Trustee, Wells Fargo, then transferred the proceeds of the 
sale to Griswold LLP, the sole beneficiary. In December 
2008, the partners of Griswold LLP filed a “Cancellation of 
                                                 
3 At the time, neither Pennsylvania nor Georgia state 
law required the policy purchaser to disclose the broker 
compensation to the policy owner. However, Pennsylvania 
law imposed a fiduciary duty on the broker to disclose the 
amount of compensation, 40 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 626.7(d). Thus 
Griswold argues that Coventry is liable for aiding and 
abetting McGarrey’s deliberate breach of fiduciary duty. 40 
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 626.2. 
 7 
 
Limited Liability Partnership Election” in Georgia state court 
pursuant to the LLP’s partnership agreement.  
In September 2010, after learning of Coventry’s alleged 
fraud, Griswold sued Coventry, Coventry Group, 
Montgomery Capital, Coventry Financial, and Reid S. 
Buerger, Coventry’s Executive Vice President, in 
Pennsylvania state court on behalf of himself—both in his 
individual capacity and as the former majority partner of 
Griswold LLP—and on behalf of a class of persons who had 
sold their life insurance policies to these Defendants. 
Griswold alleged that Coventry’s collusion with McGarrey to 
conceal his self-determined commission and rig the bidding 
process constituted common law fraud, fraudulent 
concealment, conversion, aiding and abetting the breach of 
fiduciary duties, unjust enrichment, and also violated state life 
settlement acts, the Sherman Act, and the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).  
Because the class action sought over $5 million in 
damages, Coventry removed the case to the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In 
recognition of the fact that Griswold had not signed the 
purchase agreement, Coventry filed a motion to dismiss for 
lack of standing, or in the alternative, to compel arbitration 
pursuant to the purchase agreement.4 In response, Griswold 
filed an “Election to Revive and Reinstate and Otherwise 
                                                 
4 Only the Griswold Trust, which has since dissolved, 
signed the purchase agreement; neither of the Appellees—
Griswold and Griswold LLP—were signatories. Thus, 
Coventry is the only party to this litigation to have signed the 
purchase agreement. 
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Become a Limited Liability Partnership,” followed by an 
Amended Complaint adding Griswold LLP as a Plaintiff. JA 
480. Coventry moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint.  
The District Court denied Coventry’s motion to dismiss, 
finding that because “Griswold possesses a proprietary 
interest in the property of Griswold LLP that was injured, 
both Lincoln T. Griswold and the LLP have Article III 
standing.”  JA 4. The District Court then denied Coventry’s 
alternative motion to compel arbitration, holding that the 
arbitration clause was “unenforceable as to Plaintiffs who are 
non-signatories.” Id. Coventry timely appealed. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d). We have appellate jurisdiction over the 
District Court’s denial of defendants’ motion to compel 
arbitration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B), which 
provides that “[a]n appeal may be taken” from an order 
denying a petition to compel arbitration. See E.I. Dupont de 
Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber and Resin 
Intermediates S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 204 (3d Cir. 2001). 
The parties dispute whether we have appellate 
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of 
Coventry’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing. Coventry 
argues that we have not only the authority but the obligation 
to determine whether Appellees possess standing because it is 
a “threshold jurisdictional requirement” both in the district 
court and on appeal. Coventry Br. at 18-19 (citing Majestic 
Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Development, Inc., 716 F.3d 736, 
747-49 (3d Cir. 2013) (“As a threshold matter of 
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justiciability, we must decide whether the Debtors have 
standing . . . .”); Interfaith Community Org. v. Honeywell 
Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 2005).); see also Steel 
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998) 
(“[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to 
‘satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of 
the lower courts in a cause under review.’”) (internal citation 
omitted).    
Though Coventry insists that our decision in Majestic 
Star should guide our analysis, that case bears little similarity 
to this appeal. There, the standing issue was raised for the 
first time on appeal and was inextricably intertwined with the 
merits of the case. Majestic Star, 716 F.3d at 749 (“We thus 
find ourselves in a circumstance where what is ordinarily the 
preliminary question of standing cannot be answered without 
delving into whether the entity tax status of [the debtor 
subsidiary] is ‘property’ and, if so, whether it belongs to [the 
subsidiary or the corporate parent].”). Thus, we had no choice 
but to decide the standing question in Majestic Star.  
Here, however, we must decide whether we are 
required to adjudicate the standing issue after it has already 
been decided by the District Court. As we stated in Petroleos 
Mexicanos Refinacion v. M/T King A (Ex-Tbilisi), 377 F.3d 
329 (3d Cir. 2004), “[t]here are countless cases where a 
district court rejects a defendant’s challenge to the plaintiff's 
standing; in that posture, defendants simply may not seek 
immediate review in the court of appeals.” Id. at 335. In other 
words, although standing is always a threshold issue, standing 
to appeal should not be confused with standing to sue. Once a 
district court has determined that a plaintiff has standing to 
sue, our power to adjudicate that issue on an interlocutory 
basis is limited.  
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Coventry argues that we can and should exercise 
pendent appellate jurisdiction over the District Court’s ruling 
on the standing question. Pendent appellate jurisdiction exists 
where an appealable issue is so “inextricably intertwined” 
with a nonappealable issue that one cannot resolve the former 
without addressing the latter. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 203. 
Because we have jurisdiction to review the order of the 
District Court compelling arbitration, Coventry argues, we 
should assert jurisdiction over the order denying Coventry’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of standing.  We disagree. 
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is indisputably 
“narrow” and should be used “‘sparingly’ and only where 
there is a sufficient overlap in the facts relevant to both the 
appealable and nonappealable issues to warrant plenary 
review.” Id. (emphasis in original); In re Montgomery 
County, 215 F.3d 367, 375-76 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Pendent 
appellate jurisdiction over an otherwise unappealable order is 
available only to the extent necessary to ensure meaningful 
review of an appealable order.”) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted); Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 
U.S. 35, 49-50 (1995) (warning that “loosely allowing 
pendent appellate jurisdiction would encourage parties to 
parlay Cohen-type collateral orders into multi-issue 
interlocutory appeal tickets.”).  
In DuPont, we considered whether we could review 
the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction (an otherwise nonappealable order) pendent to 
our review of a denial of a motion to compel arbitration (an 
appealable order). We held that the jurisdictional question 
was not sufficiently intertwined with the merits of the 
appealable order, requiring us to “exercise restraint and 
forego review until the unrelated issue is appealable in its 
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own right.” DuPont, 269 F.3d at 204 (citing United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Braspetro Oil Serv. Co., 199 F.3d 
94, 97 (2d Cir. 1999)).  
As personal jurisdiction and standing are both 
threshold jurisdictional questions, our reasoning in DuPont 
applies here. Moreover, as Coventry has acknowledged, 
Coventry Reply Br. at n.1, two of our sister courts have 
declined to extend pendent appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate 
district court orders on standing. Summit Medical Assoc., P.C. 
v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1334 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that 
the appealable dismissal on Eleventh Amendment immunity 
grounds was not inextricably entwined with the non-
appealable standing issue); Triad Assoc., Inc. v. Robinson, 10 
F.3d 492, 496 n.2 (7th Cir. 1993) (“To further beat the 
jurisdictional dead horse, we do not find that [the non-
appealable collateral standing issue is] ‘inextricably 
entwined’ with the appealable qualified immunity inquiry nor 
that there are ‘compelling reasons’ . . . that would justify 
invoking our rarely appropriate pendent appellate 
jurisdiction.”) (internal citation omitted).  
Like the Eleventh Circuit in Summit Medical and the 
Seventh Circuit in Triad Associates, the issues before us now 
are not sufficiently intertwined to support the exercise of 
pendent appellate jurisdiction. Regardless of how we 
adjudicate the standing question, we may still reach the 
arbitration question. Moreover, the factual underpinnings of 
the issues are distinct: the standing issue involves an inquiry 
into whether Griswold LLP remains in existence and can 
bring claims on behalf of the Trust as its sole beneficiary. In 
contrast, the question of arbitrability requires us to decide 
whether Griswold LLP, a non-signatory to the purchase 
agreement, can be bound to its arbitration clause because it 
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reaped the benefits of the contract. The two considerations are 
discrete and neither issue’s determination is dependent upon 
the other. 
 In sum, we decline to exercise pendent appellate 
jurisdiction over the District Court’s denial of Coventry’s 
motion to dismiss because it is not inextricably intertwined 
with the denial of the motion to compel arbitration, nor is its 
review necessary to adjudicate the arbitrability issue.  
III 
We turn next to the District Court’s order denying 
Coventry’s motion to compel arbitration, which the parties 
and the Court agree is now subject to our review. FAA, 9 
U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B) (providing that an appeal may be taken 
from an order denying a petition to compel arbitration); 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
We review decisions regarding the applicability and 
scope of arbitration agreements de novo, applying the same 
standard the District Court applied. SBRMCOA, LLC v. 
Bayside Resort Inc., 707 F.3d 267, 270-71 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(citing Kaneff v. Del. Title Loans, 587 F.3d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 
2009)). “A district court decides a motion to compel 
arbitration under the same standard it applies to a motion for 
summary judgment.” Kaneff, 587 F.3d at 620. “The party 
opposing arbitration is given the benefit of all reasonable 
doubts and inferences that may arise.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  
In this appeal, it is undisputed that the purchase 
agreement contained a broad arbitration clause requiring the 
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parties to arbitrate any disputes arising out of the contract.5 
Courts generally apply a presumption in favor of enforcing 
arbitration clauses. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349 
(2008) (stating that the FAA established “a national policy 
favoring arbitration when the parties contract for that mode of 
dispute resolution”); Dupont, 269 F.3d at 194 (citing Sandvik 
AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 104-05 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“The FAA establishes a strong federal policy in favor of 
compelling arbitration over litigation.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Coventry argues that because Griswold’s 
claims “touch matters covered by [an arbitration clause in a 
contract] . . . ‘those claims must be arbitrated.’” Coventry Br. 
at 39-40 (quoting Brayman Construction Corp. v. Home 
Insurance Co., 319 F.3d 622, 626 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)).    
The presumption in favor of arbitration does not 
extend, however, to non-signatories to an agreement; it 
applies only when both parties have consented to and are 
bound by the arbitration clause. See United Steelworkers of 
America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
582 (1960) (“[A] party cannot be required to submit to 
                                                 
5 The arbitration clause encompassed “[a]ll disputes 
and controversies of every kind and nature between the 
Parties arising out of or in connection with this Agreement.” 
JA 648 (emphasis added). By all accounts, the language in the 
arbitration provision is fairly standard and interpreted to 
apply broadly.  See Battaglia v. McKendry, 233 F.3d 720, 727 
(3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen phrases such as . . . ‘arising out of’ 
appear in arbitration provisions, they are normally given 
broad construction.”). 
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arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to 
submit.”); Bel-Ray Co., Inc. v. Chemrite (Pty) Ltd., 181 F.3d 
435, 444 (3d Cir. 1999) (“If a party has not agreed to 
arbitrate, the courts have no authority to mandate that he do 
so.”). Still, a non-signatory may be bound by an arbitration 
agreement if “‘traditional principles’ of state law allow a 
contract to be enforced by or against nonparties to the 
contract.” Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 
631 (2009); see also Dupont, 269 F.3d at 194 (a non-
signatory may be bound to an arbitration agreement if “under 
traditional principles of contract . . . [the party is] akin to a 
signatory of the underlying agreement”) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  
Coventry seeks to compel Appellees to arbitrate under 
one such traditional contract principle: equitable estoppel. 
Both Georgia and Pennsylvania law allow non-signatories to 
be bound to an arbitration agreement. See, e.g., Price v. Ernst 
& Young, LLP, 617 S.E.2d 156, 159 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) 
(finding that “equitable estoppel applies when the signatory to 
a written agreement containing an arbitration clause must rely 
on the terms of the written agreement in asserting its claims 
against the nonsignatory.”) (quoting MS Dealer Svc. Corp. v. 
Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999)); LaSonde v. 
CitiFinancial Mortgage Co., Inc., 614 S.E.2d 224, 226 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2005) (“Federal law provides guidance for 
determining the circumstances under which a nonsignatory 
may be bound by such agreements. And as found by both 
Georgia and federal courts, the theory of equitable estoppel 
provides one basis for bringing a nonsignatory within an 
arbitration agreement.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); Dodds v. Pulte Home Corp., 909 A.2d 348, 351 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that non-signatories to a contract 
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may be compelled to arbitrate “when there is an obvious and 
close nexus between the non-signatories and the contract or 
the contracting parties.”).6  
Estoppel “can bind a non-signatory to an arbitration 
clause when that non-signatory has reaped the benefits of a 
contract containing an arbitration clause.” Invista S.A.R.L. v. 
Rhodia, S.A., 625 F.3d 75, 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citation 
omitted). Equitable estoppel may apply under one of two 
theories, which we outlined in Dupont:  
                                                 
6 Neither party relied on Georgia or Pennsylvania law 
either in the District Court, see Griswold's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, D.E. 34 at 55-61; 
Coventry's Memorandum in Reply to Response to Motion to 
Dismiss, D.E. 38 at 68-75, or on appeal, see Coventry Br. at 
45-55; Griswold Br. at 26-28.  In a brief footnote in its reply 
brief, Coventry acknowledges that state law may be 
applicable. See Coventry Reply at 24 n.8. That belated and 
undeveloped argument is insufficient to raise a choice-of-law 
issue on appeal.  See Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 
63 F.3d 166, 180 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc) (observing that 
"choice of law issues may be waived"). 
Because we are satisfied that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Arthur Andersen did not overrule Third Circuit 
decisions consistent with relevant state law contract 
principles, we may rely on our prior decisions so long as they 
do not conflict with these Georgia and Pennsylvania state law 
principles. See Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp., 705 F.3d 
1122, 1130 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that pre-Arthur 
Andersen federal decisions consistent with relevant state 
contract principles remain good law).  
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First, courts have held non-signatories to an 
arbitration clause when the non-signatory 
knowingly exploits the agreement containing 
the arbitration clause despite having never 
signed the agreement. . . .  
Second, courts have bound a signatory to 
arbitrate with a non-signatory “at the non-
signatory’s insistence because of ‘the close 
relationship between the entities involved, as 
well as the relationship of the alleged wrongs to 
the non[-]signatory’s obligations and duties in 
the contract ... and [the fact that] the claims 
were intimately founded in and intertwined with 
the underlying contract obligations.’” 
269 F.3d at 199 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
Here, the latter theory is inapplicable because our case 
involves a signatory (Coventry) attempting to bind a non-
signatory (Griswold) to the arbitration clause, rather than the 
inverse.7 See id. at 202 (“Appellants recognize that these 
cases bind a signatory not a non-signatory to arbitration, but 
argue that this is a distinction without a difference. They are 
wrong.”) (emphasis in original). 
                                                 
7 The other Appellants—Coventry Group, 
Montgomery Capital, Coventry Financial, and Reid S. 
Buerger—were non-signatories to the purchase agreement, 
and therefore cannot bind other non-signatories. Invista, 625 
F.3d at 85 (stating that the party seeking to compel arbitration 
had “offer[ed] no authority for its contention that a non-
signatory to an arbitration agreement can compel another 
non-signatory to arbitrate certain claims, and we have found 
none”). 
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 Coventry asserts that under the first theory of equitable 
estoppel—the “knowingly exploits” theory—a non-signatory 
may be bound by an arbitration clause if it “embraces the 
agreement and directly benefits from it.” Bouriez v. Carnegie 
Mellon Univ., 359 F.3d 292, 295 (3d Cir. 2004). “A non-
signatory can ‘embrace’ a contract in two ways: (1) by 
knowingly seeking and obtaining direct benefits from that 
contract; or (2) by seeking to enforce terms of that contract or 
asserting claims [based on the contract’s other provisions].” 
Haskins v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 2d 343, 350 
(D.N.J. 2012) (quoting Noble Drilling Services, Inc. v. Certex 
USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Equitable estoppel thus prevents a non-signatory from 
“‘cherry-picking’ the provisions of a contract that it will 
benefit from and ignoring other provisions that don’t benefit 
it or that it would prefer not to be governed by (such as an 
arbitration clause).” Invista, 625 F.3d at 85 (internal citation 
omitted); see also DuPont, 269 F.3d at 200 (“To allow [a 
non-signatory] to claim the benefit of the contract and 
simultaneously avoid its burdens would both disregard equity 
and contravene the purposes underlying enactment of the 
Arbitration Act.”) (internal citation omitted). A non-signatory 
cannot knowingly embrace the contract only to later “turn its 
back” on other provisions in the contract, such as an 
arbitration clause. Dupont, 269 F.3d at 199. 
 In DuPont, plaintiff was the parent company to a 
subsidiary that had signed a joint venture agreement with two 
other companies. The agreement provided that DuPont, a 
non-signatory, would “assist . . . in the balancing of foreign 
exchange during the [joint venture's] initial years” and “not 
take action detrimental to the interest or well-being of the 
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[joint venture].” 269 F.3d at 191, 192 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). DuPont and Rhodia, a signatory to the joint 
venture agreement, entered into three agreements related to 
the joint venture: a supply agreement, a license contract and 
an export sales agreement. Id. at 192. 
When the joint venture failed, DuPont sued the parties, 
including Rhodia, alleging breach of an oral contract to fully 
perform the joint venture agreement. Rhodia sought to bind 
DuPont, a non-signatory, to the agreement’s arbitration 
clause. We held that DuPont had not “embraced the 
Agreement itself during the lifetime of the Agreement,” and 
that it had not “received any direct benefit under the 
Agreement.” Id. at 200 (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, 
we expressed concern that DuPont’s claim against Rhodia 
seemed to “(a) embrace[ ] the underlying Agreement and (b) 
require[ ] proof that Rhodia . . . ultimately breached the 
underlying Agreement.” Id. at 201. 
What gives us some pause . . . is that a close 
examination of the Amended Complaint reveals 
that, at bottom, DuPont’s claims arise, at least 
in part, from the underlying Agreement. . . . On 
the one hand, we must be careful about 
disregarding the corporate form and treating a 
non-signatory like a signatory. On the other 
hand, by alleging, albeit by virtue of a separate 
oral agreement, that Rhodia Fiber failed to 
secure loan guarantees, DuPont’s claim against 
Rhodia Fiber implicates, at least in part, the 
very Agreement which DuPont repudiates to 
avoid arbitration. It is, however, that separate 
oral agreement that saves the day for DuPont 
because, wholly apart from whether Rhodia 
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Fiber breached the Agreement, what is at the 
core of this case is the conduct and the 
statements of the appellants’ representative [in 
making the oral promise]. 
Id. at 200-01. We thus held that DuPont was not bound to the 
arbitration clause because its claim did not hinge on whether 
Rhodia breached the joint venture agreement itself, but rather 
on an oral promise made outside of, albeit related to, the 
agreement.  
 In this sense, our case bears substantial similarity to 
DuPont. Here, what “saves the day” for Griswold is the fact 
that the alleged “Secret McGarrey Agreement” took place 
prior to and apart from the execution of the purchase 
agreement. Of course, that alleged fraud was related to the 
purchase agreement—it set the purchase price and, allegedly, 
the inflated, undisclosed broker’s commission. But that alone 
is not sufficient to compel arbitration under the equitable 
estoppel doctrine: the claims must be based directly on the 
agreement. Id. Here, Appellees’ Amended Complaint 
sufficiently alleged their injury without mention of the 
purchase agreement. Put simply, Appellees do not allege 
breach of the purchase agreement; they allege fraud 
antecedent to the purchase agreement.  
 Our relatively narrow application of the equitable 
estoppel exception is further reinforced by Bouriez, 359 F.3d 
at 294-96. Bouriez sued Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) 
for fraudulent inducement to enter a shareholders’ agreement 
with Governors Technologies to fund projects at CMU. CMU 
then sought to compel arbitration against Bouriez based on a 
contract between CMU and Governors Technologies. The 
District Court ordered arbitration and we reversed, holding 
 20 
 
that equitable estoppel did not support binding Bouriez, a 
non-signatory, to the arbitration clause as there was no 
evidence in the record to indicate that Bouriez had directly 
benefited from the contract. At most, the facts showed that 
Bouriez became a minority shareholder in Governors 
Technologies for the sole purpose of funding a CMU project; 
no evidence indicated that benefits from that project would 
flow to Bouriez directly.  Id. at 295.  
In Bouriez, we relied heavily on Industrial Electronics 
Corp. of Wisconsin v. iPower Distribution Group, 215 F.3d 
677 (7th Cir. 2000), whose facts we declared “nearly 
identical” to those in Bouriez. 359 F.3d at 295. In Industrial 
Electronics, plaintiffs alleged that iPower fraudulently 
induced Industrial Electronics to enter into an association of 
other companies. Industrial Electronics sued, and iPower 
sought to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause 
in the franchise agreement between iPower and the 
association. Id. (citing Industrial Electronics, 215 F.3d at 
679). The Seventh Circuit held that Industrial Electronics’ 
claims were not based on the franchise agreement, nor had the 
corporation directly benefited from the agreement; therefore, 
it could not be bound by its arbitration clause. Id. (quoting 
Industrial Electronics, 215 F.3d at 681) (“A dispute that 
arises under one agreement may be litigated notwithstanding 
a mandatory arbitration clause in a second agreement, even 
where the two agreements are closely intertwined.”). 
As in DuPont, Bouriez, and Industrial Electronics, the 
fraudulent conduct alleged in this case—the “Secret 
McGarrey Agreement”—took place prior to and apart from 
the purchase agreement. Accordingly, the District Court 
properly found that Griswold’s claims “would exist even if 
the contract containing the arbitration clause were void,” and 
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are “independent of the Purchase Agreement at issue.” JA4-5. 
In other words, because the “Secret McGarrey Agreement” 
was not incorporated into the purchase agreement, Appellees’ 
claims do not allege a breach of that agreement and they are 
not bound by its terms. Therefore, Coventry cannot compel 
arbitration against Appellees, who never consented to the 
purchase agreement.8   
                                                 
8 Because we find that Coventry cannot compel 
arbitration, we need not reach the question of whether 
Appellees would be required to arbitrate their claims on an 
individual rather than a class basis. However, because the 
parties request that we specify the answer to that question in 
this appeal, we will note that Appellees waived their class 
action claim on appeal, having neglected to properly brief the 
issue and having conceded as much at oral argument. Only in 
the very last footnote of their brief do Appellees discuss the 
issue of class status, and only abstractly:  
[T]he class plaintiff’s individual standing, linked to his 
or her asserted claim, becomes automatically linked to 
the class claim. Having standing which a class 
representative shares with the members of a class is 
another way of saying that the class representative is a 
proper party to raise a particular issue common to the 
class . . . . 
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*  *  * 
 For the reasons stated, we hold that we lack appellate 
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of 
Coventry’s motion to dismiss. And we will affirm the District 
Court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration against 
Griswold and Griswold LLP. 
                                                                                                             
Griswold Br. at 58. Aside from this footnote, Appellees make 
no attempt to reassert class status. Because they failed to brief 
the issue on appeal and conceded as much at oral argument, 
they have forfeited the argument. See John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. 
v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(“[A]rguments raised in passing (such as, in a footnote), but 
not squarely argued, are considered waived.”). 
